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 The objective of this paper is to address the economic benefits in term of 
generation revenue and demand payment for the pool based market model in 
Malaysia electricity supply industry (MESI). In pool market model, there are 
issues on the benefit of the generators such as too high system marginal price 
(SMP) during peak demand and no revenue during low demand. Therefore, 
conceptual study for two bus test system in MESI involving four generators 
around Peninsular Malaysia is conducted to perform the economic analysis in 
term of generation revenue and demand assessment considering existing 
single buyer model and pool based market model, i.e., pool model, spot 
market model and the proposed model, in order to identify which market 
model is superior. As a result, the proposed model managed to decrease the 
demand payment as it is proportional to generation revenue, even though the 
generation revenue is at intermediate value and succeed to increase the low 
and medium generator’s revenue. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The historical evolution of Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) leads to the formalization 
of the single buyer. Worldwide experience has raised concern on the single buyer model as it is lack of 
transparency and fairness, poor system planning and non-competitive procurement which are some of the 
drawbacks due to poorly constructed [1]. Several observers citing conflict of interest, duplication of cost and 
tariff hikes and these concerns can be mitigated as long as the single buyer remains regulated [2]. MESI 
continues to face multi-dimensional challenges in term of tightness in fuel supply, industry governance and 
unsustainable tariff structure [3]. Therefore, more reform initiatives for MESI are expected to be 
implemented in the near future. Hence, the pool market model is the most preferred electricity market model. 
The discrepancies for the single buyer model, pool market model, spot market model, and the proposed 
model will be explained in next section. 
The aim of this research study is to improve the pool based market model which useful for MESI, in 
order to enhance efficiency and to promote competition in order to lower costs. The objective is to identify 
which market model is superior using two bus test system in MESI involving four generators around 
Peninsular Malaysia with combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and thermal power plants. Consequently, the 
findings can be applied in assisting and creating new policy set out for better electricity market model as; 
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a. Single buyer model 
There are two types of payment in single buyer model applied by MESI, which are energy payment 
and capacity payment bound under the Power Purchased Agreements (PPA) [4]. For energy payment, Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad (TNB) will only pay for the amount of the energy it took from the Independent Power 
Producers (IPP) [5, 6]. Meanwhile, the capacity payment is the amount of payment which TNB has to pay 
regardless whether the generated power is used or not and it is mean for the IPP to recover a portion of its 
investment [7]. The role for this payment is to provide extra revenue to the generator which are not generated 
through the charges of energy price. However, the energy price is the key of the pattern dispatch. Ideally, 
only the cheaper generator or lowest running cost generator should be generating power to meet  
load demand. 
b. Pool market model 
The pool market model pricing scheme can be applied into two types; uniform price which based on 
the system marginal price, and pay as bid which is based on the generator’s energy bid price [8]. The final 
price paid to the generators is a combination of system marginal price (SMP), loss of load probability 
(LOLP) and the value of lost load (VOLL) [9]. As the pure pool does not provide capacity payment to the 
generator, during low load demand, expensive generators may expose to losses due to not being selected to 
supply electricity [10]. For the pure pool market, the equation for pool purchased price, PPP is only based on 
the SMP [11]. 
c. Spot market model 
The electricity market in Australia is based on the energy only market design. The pool is managed 
by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) [12, 13]. AEMO issues dispatch instructions to 
generators at five-minute intervals throughout each day based on the offers generators have submitted in the 
bidding process [14]. The electricity is traded in a constrained real time spot market where prices are set each 
5 minutes by AEMO [15]. The generators submit offers every five minutes and a dispatch price is determined 
every five minutes. The final price is determined as the six dispatch prices are averaged every half-hour to 
determine the spot price for each trading interval for each of the regions of the Australian National Electricity 
Market (NEM) [16]. AEMO uses the spot price as the basis for the settlement of financial transactions for all 
energy traded in the NEM [17]. There are 288 dispatch intervals every day [16]. The dispatch price 
represents the cost to supply the last megawatt of electricity to meet demand, and applies to all generators 
scheduled into production regardless of the level of their original offer. A trading interval in the NEM is a 
half-hour period [18]. Hence, there are 48 trading intervals in the market each day. The spot price of 
electricity for all 30-minute trading intervals each day is the average of the six dispatch prices during the 
preceding half-hour. 
d. The proposed model 
The proposed model apply the approaches of the minimum generation capacity payment 
mechanism, and base load demand sharing involving the efficiency of the generators [19]. These approaches 
are to educate the generators to apply low prices for electricity generated, so that the IPPs can contribute 
power to the power purchaser at all times [20-22]. The proposed model has categorised the electricity 
demand into two areas, high demand area and low demand area which determined from the daily electricity 
demand curve. A line is drawn on the hourly electricity demand curve at 80% of the peak demand as the 
reference line to distinguish the low demand, and high demand areas [19]. The low demand area consists of 
the hourly electricity demand below the 80% of the peak demand value and will be traded through bidding 
competition as in the pool market plus with the minimum generation capacity payment [23]. However, the 
80% reference line will separate electricity demand in the high area into two parts [19]. First, the electricity 
demand below the 80% reference line will be traded equally among the base load plants through demand 
sharing approach. Second, all IPPs will compete against each other to supply the remaining demand in the 
area above the 80% reference line in pool market based on energy price [23].  
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
Figure 1 illustrated the two bus system to provide an understanding on the basic concept of proposed 
approach. The case study is carried out by calculating the generation revenue for four generators around 
Peninsular Malaysia. The analysis of the power generation revenue is conducted at low load demand (1500 
MW), medium demand (3250 MW) and high demand (5000 MW) to acquire the results of generator’s 
revenue for pool based market model. Four criteria are taken into accounts; the available capacity for each 
generator in megawatt (MW), the capacity price in RM/kW/month, energy price in RM/MWh and efficiency, 
η, as shown in Table 1. Since, the monetary values involved in the study are confidential; therefore estimated 
values are being used instead. 
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Figure 1. Four generators with two loads 
 
 
Table 1. The details of each IPP in 2-bus Malaysia electricity system 
Gen. Plant Type Available Capacity (MW) 
Capacity Price 
(RM/MWh/month) 
Energy Price 
(RM/MWh) 
Efficiency, η (%) 
G1 CCGT 650 35000 155 43.64 
G2 Thermal 2070 30000 160 20.91 
G3 Thermal 2100 55000 170 25.82 
G4 CCGT 440 30000 200 43.64 
 
 
The purpose is to detail out the explanations towards the trading in pool based market model, in 
order to see the effect of load variation towards the generator’s revenue, total generation revenue and demand 
payment. Figure 2 shows the aggregated generation curve for the bidding process. The transmission network 
is assumed to be lossless. The available capacities in MW for each of these busses are being used to acquire 
all the results for generation revenue. Only combine cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and thermal plant type are 
chosen due to the efficiency and price offered by the generator. This is because the generation costs of open 
cycle gas turbine (OCGT) are much higher. However, the main reason for the OCGT high generation cost is 
the low load-factor of the peak-load services [24, 25]. From the results, a proper and depth analysis  
was discussed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The aggregated generation curve and the SMP at 30%, 50%, 80% and 100% 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
Four generators with two loads that supply 1500 MW, 3250 MW, and 5000 MW demand is used in 
this case study. The comparison have been done between the single buyer model, pool model, spot market 
model and the proposed model in order to see the variation of economic benefit in term of IPP’s generation 
revenue, which is represented by the generators, total generation revenue based on demand, and investigation 
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on demand payment to analysis the payment by energy’s buyer to the power producer according to the 
demand. Based on the analysis of the electricity demand values in MW, there are four categories; 30% 
demand, 50% demand, 80% demand, and 100% demand as shown in Table 2. In order to be chosen in the 
generation dispatch, IPPs must win the energy bidding. The IPPs with lower energy bid price contrasted with 
the hourly SMP will be chosen to satisfy the power demand for that hour. The SMP at specific hour is 
determined when the load curve and supply curve intersect as shown in Figure 2. Thus, the SMP determined 
the payment for all in-merit generators. The SMP at 100% demand was RM 200 followed by RM 170 for 
80% demand, and RM 160 for 50% and 30% demand respectively. These SMP will be used to determine the 
pool purchased price. All participated IPPs in the electricity dispatch will be paid according to the pool 
purchased price which is determined from hourly SMP, rather than the initial bid. Therefore, the non-
participated IPPs are exposed to the risk of losing their revenue, because only at 100% demand, all IPPs 
received the revenue. This means that more IPPs will lose their revenue as the electricity demand keeps 
reducing, but instead the IPPs revenue in the pool market continues to strike as the demand keeps increasing 
due to most IPPs are paid at higher price compared to their own bid price. For example, IPP 1 is paid with 
RM 200 for every MW power produced at 100% demand, which is RM 45 higher compared to its initial bid 
price. Therefore, in the proposed model, power contribution is chosen at 80% for demand sharing which the 
resulting SMP, RM 170 will make the production cost of electricity will be lower, in order to control the 
price fluctuation during high demand. The analysis in term of economic benefit will be carried out to see the 
performance of IPP’s generation revenue, total generation revenue and investigation on demand side 
regarding the payment by the purchasers to the power producers. 
 
 
Table 2. Summarised of the SMP according to demand 
Gen. 
Energy Price 
(RM/MWh) 
SMP (RM) with Demand Contribution at 
1500 MW (30%) 2500 MW (50%) 4000 MW (80%) 5000 MW (100%) 
G1 155 160 160 170 200 
G2 160 160 160 170 200 
G3 170 160 160 170 200 
G4 200 160 160 170 200 
 
 
The applied values of capacity price for the generators are differ from one another because of 
different mechanism and approaches to produce electric power such as fuel type, and the distance of the plant 
to the transmission. Even though, the energy payment can cover the variable costs such as labour cost, 
maintenance cost, and fuel cost, significantly, inadequate capacity payment reduces the generator ability to 
cover its fixed costs and will lead to poor performances. The importance of capacity payment mechanisms in 
electricity markets is to ensure security of electricity supply, and to fill the “missing-money” gap. In MESI, 
some of the IPPs have covered their fixed cost in ten years. As the PPAs are applied for 21 years, full 
capacity payment still continuously paid which caused financial lost to the energy buyers. Therefore, the 
purposed of the new mechanism for capacity payment is to solve the capacity payment issue. Instead of 
paying full capacity payment to the generator, minimum generation capacity payment based on generator’s 
efficiency is introduced as compensation because the possibility of expensive generators for not being 
selected in the bidding competition is high, so that the IPPs can covers their variable cost. Meanwhile, the 
IPPs which have won in the bidding competition also will be given this same type of capacity payment as an 
incentive. Significantly, this incentive as a reward in order to educate the IPPs to bid, and sell their electricity 
produced at lower price. Furthermore, the IPPs are able to compete for more dispatch, and gain  
more revenue.  
 
3.1. Generation revenue 
To illustrate more details, Figure 3 shows the generation revenue for each generator during low, 
medium and high demand for Gen 1 and Gen 2. The generators represented the IPPs involved in the bidding 
competition. Meanwhile, generation revenue clarifies the payment received by the IPPs from the generated 
energy and the market models represent the different types of market model used in the comparison.For 
single buyer, during all demand, Gen 1 and Gen 2 received full payment from energy and capacity payment. 
Meanwhile, the proposed model, generation revenue for Gen 1 and Gen 2 are increased during low and 
medium demand compared to pool and spot market models due to improvement in capacity payment which 
fulfill the requirement in term of generator’s efficiency and cost. Gen 1 and Gen 2 for pool and spot market 
models show the same pattern during low and medium demand, but generation revenue for the spot market 
slightly lower compared to pool model because of spot prices were taken from the average of dispatch prices 
in half an hour. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Gen 1 and Gen 2 revenue for low, medium and high demand 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the generator’s revenue for Gen 3 and Gen 4 during low to high demand. According 
to single buyer model, the generation revenue for Gen 3 continued to increase compared to others market 
models, while no revenue for Gen 3 and Gen 4 for pool and spot market models during low demand. This 
shows the weaknesses of pool market, where too high SMP during peak demand and no revenue during low 
demand. During medium demand, Gen 3 shows that the pool and spot market models revenue increased due 
to demand increase, which opens chances for expensive generators to be selected in the bidding competition. 
The revenue for proposed market is increased compared to the pool and spot market models by 39.68% and 
61.81% respectively due to the improvement in capacity payment. The revenue for pool model increased 
when SMP is high during peak demand. The revenue for the proposed model decreased compared to pool 
model by 15.21% due to base load sharing approach and pool trading during high demand. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Gen 3 and Gen 4 revenue for low, medium and high demand 
 
 
There was no revenue during low and medium demand for Gen 4, which is categorised as an 
expensive generator for pool and spot market models due to the pattern dispatch, where the generators are 
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ranked due to energy price, from the lowest price to the highest price. Thus, the cheapest generator should be 
generating to meet demand, causing the expensive generator to lose in the bidding competition. Meanwhile, 
there was no energy payment for the single buyer model during low and medium demand and the revenue 
only depended on the full capacity payment. Even though there was no energy usage during that moment, the 
purchaser still needed to bear the expenses due to full capacity payment. However, the proposed model 
managed to gain revenue due to minimum generation capacity payment which was given as compensation 
and stayed online when electricity was needed. During high demand, the proposed model still managed to 
receive the revenue for the expensive generator due to pool trading for the remaining demand from the base 
load sharing. Table 3 shows the total result of each generator’s revenue, which represent the IPPs. 
 
 
Table 3. IPP’s generation revenue 
 Total Revenue (RM) 
Gen Single Buyer Pool Spot Market Proposed Method 
G1 397,041.67 396,980.82 344,500.00 400,475.48 
G2 1,057,150.00 1,036,141.37 901,900.00 997,275.54 
G3 928,350.00 580,757.26 510,100.00 591,147.44 
G4 100,166.67 40,832.88 36,000.00 54,668.22 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the comparison of the total generator’s revenue for single buyer, pool, spot 
market and the proposed models. The generation revenue from Gen 1 until Gen 4 for single buyer is the 
highest due to energy and capacity payment, even though most of the Gen 3 and Gen 4 did not receive any 
energy payment during low and medium demand. The spot market has similar characteristics to the pool 
model, but the revenue is slightly lower compared to the pool model because the energy is paid according to 
spot prices. The SMP for pool model is varied due to the demand of a certain period. Under the pool model, 
the revenues for Gen 1 to Gen 3 are slightly higher compared to the expensive generator, Gen 4, because the 
generators were stacked from the lowest to the highest prices offered. Therefore, the cheaper generators 
obtained more chances to win the bidding competition.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of total generator’s revenue according to market model 
 
 
Furthermore, during high demand, the low cost generators received excessive revenue due to high 
SMP. Compared to the spot market model, the generator’s revenue for Gen 1 to Gen 3 of the proposed model 
is higher due to the minimum generation capacity payment and base load sharing approaches. These adding 
properties reduce the revenue for the expensive generators and lessen the power of bigger capacity generators 
in order to assure a worthy generation of revenue for all generators as a producer, and a worthy payment for 
the purchasers. The proposed model guarantees the benefit of all generators regardless of the variation of 
electricity demand. This will help to educate the generators to bid at cheaper prices for more revenue. It is 
reasonable that the efficiency of the generator will limit the capacity payment as it describes the real ability 
and performance of the generator. 
Table 4 shows the detailed result of total generation revenue based on demand. From the result, the 
total revenue for the proposed model is lower compared to the single buyer and pool models which benefit 
the energy buyers as the value of total revenue for the proposed model is intermediate and will decrease the 
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demand payment. Meanwhile, Figure 6 shows the comparison of total revenue generation based on demand 
according to the types of market models. The single buyer model received the highest revenue for all types of 
demand. During low demand, the revenue for the proposed model was higher by 29.45 % compared to the 
pool model due to the implementation of minimum generation capacity payment. However, the pool model 
indicates the highest generation revenue during peak demand due to high SMP. The revenue for spot market 
model also exceeded the proposed model during peak demand. This is because when the demand increased, 
the dispatch price also increased which influenced the spot price. Meanwhile, the generation revenue for the 
proposed model is lower due to only one SMP during the base load sharing at high demand. The total 
generation revenue for the proposed model improved by 0.54%, -14% and 17.69% compared to the pool, spot 
market and single buyer model, respectively.  
 
 
Table 4. Generation revenue based on demand 
 Total Revenue (RM) 
Demand (MW) Single Buyer Pool Spot Market Proposed Method 
1500 536,402.78 280,438.36 240,000.00 363,015.95 
3250 821,702.78 640,027.40 552,500.00 722,604.99 
5000 1,124,602.78 1,134,246.58 1,000,000.00 957,945.74 
Total 2,482,708.33 2,054,712.33 1,792,500.00 2,043,566.68 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of total generation revenue based on demand 
 
 
Table 5 shows the percentages improvement and reduction in terms of generation revenue, 
considering the single buyer as a base. The sign of negative data indicates the reduction percentages of 
generation revenue. Based on percentages, the revenue for pool and spot market models reduced more than 
the proposed model. During peak demand, the revenue for the pool model is slightly higher compared to the 
single buyer model due to high SMP. Meanwhile, the revenue for the proposed model reduced more 
compared to the spot market during peak demand due to the base load sharing approach which lessened 
market power exercises. The reduced percentages indicate the improvement in lowering the demand 
payment. Even though the pool and spot market models show the reduction in percentages of generation 
revenue significantly, but still cannot guarantee reasonable income for expensive generators compared to the 
proposed model during low demand. The base load demand sharing approach in the proposed model has 
equal opportunities to participate in the trading and receive revenue for their contribution and guarantees the 
participation of all IPPs in the hourly trading period excluding the highest price generator. 
 
 
Table 5. Percentages improvement and reduction in term of generation revenue 
Demand (MW) Pool Spot Market Proposed Method 
1500 -47.72 -55.26 -32.32 
3250 -22.11 -32.76 -12.06 
5000 0.86 -11.08 -14.82 
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3.2. Demand payment 
Figure 7 shows shows the comparison of the analysis for the demand investigation. This demand 
investigation is to analyse the amount of electricity generated to be paid by the purchasers to the power 
producers. Considering the single buyer as a base, the payment to be made for pool, spot market and 
proposed models decreased by 17.24%, 27.8% and 17.69%, respectively. Even though the demand payment 
for spot market model is the lowest which benefit the energy buyer, this model cannot guarantee any revenue 
for expensive generators during low demand. The proposed model not only considers the efficiency and 
energy price offered by the generators, also the demand payment is reasonable to the purchasers. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The analysis of the demand side investigation 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
Under the single buyer model, the generators had gained the largest revenue due to the existence of 
both capacity and energy payment. These generators still can obtain revenue even without any contribution to 
supply the load demand. This model does not provide any competition due to the long-term agreement; that 
simplify the electricity trading under one company which is TNB transmission and distribution. The pool 
market model offers full competitive model and based on uniform price scheme. This model fully removed 
the capacity payment and therefore reduces the revenue some of the generators quite significantly. The most 
expensive generators might not be able to get any revenue at all and hence will force each of them to bid for 
the cheapest energy price most of the time and this will create competition. Overall, the pool and spot market 
models show similar characteristic. 
From the observation, the result indicates that the proposed model managed to overcome the 
problem of the pool model due to low or no revenue during low demand and price fluctuations during high 
demand which caused power market exercise. The proposed model still maintained the capacity payment in a 
fair manner which benefit the generators without burdening the purchasers with high price energy. The 
proposed model gives the opportunity more to the least cost generators to participate not only in base load 
demand but also in peak load demand. The minimum generation capacity payment also been given as an 
incentive and compensation for the least cost and expensive generator, which participate and lost in bidding 
competition respectively, it create win-win situation between the generators as the seller and distributor as  
the buyer. 
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